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LECTURES




My presentation will examine the vision of women's rights and
equality as outlined in the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, "CEDAW".' The
presentation will raise some of the possibilities and limitations
associated with universalizing legal norms in a context of enormous
global disparities, particularly in material and cultural terms. My
friend and colleague, Professor Thandabantu Nhlapo, has raised
some of these points in his presentation. I have chosen four issues
to illustrate the possibilities and limitations of CEDAW's reach.
2
First, the limitations of universalizing legal norms are apparent
in societies that confront legacies of war, dislocation, and
dispossession. Much of Africa, for example, is currently
experiencing the consequences of war, dislocation, and
dispossession. There are other parts of the world, such as
Afghanistan, that are also experiencing the ravages of war and
* Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law. The presenter would like
to thank Professors Reyhan and Gathii for organizing the symposium.
G.A. Res. 180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180 (1980), reprinted in 19
I.L.M. 33 (1980), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatchdaw/cedaw [hereinafter
CEDAW].
2 For an analysis of CEDAW, see Laura Reanda, The Commission on the Status of Women,
in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 283, 286-88 (Philip
Alston ed., 1992). See also Andrew Byrnes, Toward More Effective Enforcement of Women's
Human Rights Through the Use of International Human Rights Law and Procedures, in
HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 189, 212-13
(Rebecca J. Cook ed. 1994) (recognizing the importance of CEDAW in at least addressing the
need for individual complaint procedures as part of the treaty's overall scheme).
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dislocation. (I shall address the situation of Afghanistan later in
this discussion.) Second, legal strategies adopted to achieve
equality under the CEDAW model are premised on liberal
assumptions that do not exist in large parts of the globe. Third,
CEDAW advances a secular vision of individual rights enforcement
and as a result could be limited in contexts of deeply entrenched
cultural and religious mores. Finally, although CEDAW recognizes
collective rights, it does not adequately address the contradictions
inherent in the individual rights enforcement project within
communitarian imperatives. In other words, CEDAW does not
provide clear guidance in balancing individual rights with
community needs in societies in which the interplay of individual
rights and community concerns are constantly negotiated.
Professor Nhlapo referred to these questions in his comments, and
he has written extensively on these issues.3
Our panel is focused specifically on how CEDAW operates in the
advancement of human rights outside of Judeo-Christian contexts.
These contexts, as exemplified by the four issues highlighted above,
require innovative approaches to the implementation of rights. For
the most part, the implementation of CEDAW will occur within
societies with extremely limited resources and in those where there
has been a breakdown of the formal institutions of the society. For
women who have to survive in these contexts, culture is largely
negotiated through economic considerations, which raise
complicated and sensitive questions.
When CEDAW was promulgated in the 1970s, the framework of
international law, politics, and economics was clearly different from
that which pertains today. The parameters and the human rights
imagination of the globe was confined to demarcated boundaries-
first world and third world, east and west, developed and
underdeveloped-and the ravages of this contemporary period of
globalization, and particularly the structural adjustment initiatives
of the 1970s, had really not yet been fully experienced and
appreciated. 4
3 See, e.g., Thandabantu Nhlapo, African Customary Law in the interim Constitution, in
THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA FROM A GENDER PERSPECTIVE 157, 159-63 (Sandra
Liebenberg ed. 1995) (showing some of the deeply entrenched cultural norms which may
conflict with CEDAW principles in certain male-dominated African societies); see also
Thandabantu Nhlapo, Cultural Diversity, Human Rights and the Family in Contemporary
Africa: Lessons from the South African Constitutional Debate, 9 INT'L J.L. & FAM. 208, 214-
15 (1995) (suggesting that many in Africa continue to think of themselves in the collective
despite the individualistic influences of Westernization).
4 The impact of globalization has been documented in great detail. See, e.g., TYLER
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It is arguable that the adoption of CEDAW was an indication of a
universal consensus (albeit uneven) about the possibilities of legal
processes in changing people's lives. The subsequent levels of local
and global dislocation, violence, and lawlessness could not have
been predicted. Nor could it have been predicted that the
implementation of rights would still, thirty years later, be
predicated on questions of daily survival. So too, this historical
global juncture, described as one of the clash of cultures involving
the Islamic world on the one hand, and the Judeo-Christian world
on the other, was not contemplated.
II. "CLASH OF CULTURES": THE UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS
NORMS
While preparing my comments for this panel, I was playing in my
mind some vignettes that I wanted to share with you which
underscore the issue of "culture" in various contexts. I have chosen
four:
Vignette 1: I do not know if any of you have read Barbara
Kingsolver's book, The Poisonwood Bible,5 which was set in the
Congo in the early 1960's. There is a wonderful scene in the book in
which one of the protagonists-an overly zealous preacher from the
South of the United States-comes to christianize and civilize the
locals. In this endeavor, he has to introduce both the New
Testament and ideas of Western democracy. The village is self-
sufficient; politically, economically, and culturally. The American
preacher encourages people to come to church on Sundays, but the
villagers have their own religion and the chief of the village is
opposed to the activities of the preacher. One scene in the book
highlights the contestation of the two cultures. The villagers decide
that they will attend church services, but since they also have the
right to vote, they will use their vote to determine whether Jesus
does exist. Of course democracy is a good thing; so too is
Christianity. But the Christian faith does not allow for discussion
and debate about the existence of Jesus. This farcical process-in
COWEN, CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: How GLOBALIZATION IS CHANGING THE WORLD'S CULTURES
93-95 (2002) (presenting both Hollywood movies and McDonald's as cultural exports which
increase America's influence abroad); SURJIT S. BHALLA, IMAGINE THERE'S No COUNTRY:
POVERTY, INEQUALITY AND GROWTH IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 201-02 (2002) (positing
that globalization actually has had a positive effect on the world's poor). See generally
ANTHONY GIDDENS, RUNAWAY WORLD: How GLOBALIZATION IS RESHAPING OUR LIVES (2000).
' BARBARA KINGSOLVER, THE POISONWOOD BIBLE 327 (1999).
6 Id. at 327-34.
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which the villagers exercise their democratic rights to allow
Christianity in the village-plays out in very funny ways and some
scenes are quite hysterical.
Vignette 2: Last year, my visit to Sydney Law School coincided
with the Miss World contest which was being held in Nigeria. The
ostensible purpose for holding the Miss World contest there was to
give international publicity to the death sentence which had been
imposed on a Muslim woman in the North for committing adultery.
This case had indeed received widespread international attention.
Most feminists would argue that beauty competitions-including
the Miss World Beauty Pageant-negatively impact women's rights
and equality. I recall watching a television interview with the
current Miss Australia, perfectly made up and extremely elegant,
discussing the case and mouthing feminist rhetoric-the likes of
which even Catharine MacKinnon would be proud. What I
witnessed was a Western beauty queen expressing a deep desire for
the liberation of the downtrodden, indeed condemned, African
woman.
Vignette 3: I read a story in the New York Times in which a
gathering of women from Ethiopia had outlawed the practice of
female genital surgeries. Part of the discussion revolved around the
best ways of dealing with the abolition of the practice. The question
was a choice between a punitive approach, which focused on the
perpetrators, or an educational approach, which would incorporate
rewards for compliance. Illustrative of the second approach, I recall
the granting of the Reebok Human Rights Award some years back
to a group of chiefs in Uganda who had banished the practice of
female genital mutilation in their village.
Vignette 4: I remember hearing a report on one of the television
networks in New York City claiming that Tupperware parties had
been replaced by Botox parties as the preferred weekend afternoon
pastime of middle-class, middle-aged women: specifically those who
find the physical effects of aging burdensome and who may be able
to superficially alter these effects. This report made me consider
how a society so liberated, with so many options for women, and
which in many ways was a leader in the struggle for women's rights,
' Catharine A. MacKinnon is a professor of law at the University of Michigan Law School
who is recognized as a leading scholar on the issue of sex equality. She has written numerous
books on the subject, and co-directs The Lawyers Alliance for Women (LAW) Project of
Equality Now, a group promoting rights for women around the world. The University of
Michigan Law School, Catharine A. MacKinnon, at http://cgi2.www.law.umich.eduFaculty
BioPage/facultybiopagenew.asp?ID=219 (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
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could so willingly acquiesce in this collective obsession with youth-
which largely has a deleterious impact on women.
I mention these vignettes for a few reasons. First, when we think
of culture, we always think of culture out there. We have become
inured to ways of exoticising culture so that it involves only those
who are not part of the mainstream in our society. This approach
therefore robs us of the ability to turn the spotlight on our own
culture and the ways that it may demean women, or even further
the cause of women's liberation.
The second reason why I mention these vignettes is because
cultural contexts raise all kinds of contradictions. Because of our
varied experiences, and because globally, women have so many
cultural templates to work from, we either fail to see the
contradictions, or simply accept them as natural or immutable.
This inability to confront our own culture's contradictions, and to
concentrate only on those of the other, obscure our ability to
appreciate the interplay of culture with human rights and to engage
in a fruitful dialogue about the implementation and enforcement of
rights globally.
Very often when we talk about a particular cultural practice that
is offensive to our sensibilities, the impetus for us as human rights
activists is either to liberate the affected community or to eliminate
the particular practice. In our ardor, what often happens is that
two important questions fail to be addressed: First, which other
forces are we liberating; and second, which other constraints are
being discarded? Failing to raise these important questions results
in a focus on the immediate cultural practice and ignorance of the
larger cultural picture.
Religious, nationalist, or cultural considerations have always
influenced the substance of human rights. They have generated
substantial debates about the universality of human rights norms,
and have formed the basis for the ample reservations state actors
have with the international human rights treaties they may have
signed, particularly as they pertain to women. In fact, the
parameters of the discussion-that is, secularism versus religion or
culture-are somewhat artificial. Although the collection of
international instruments and custom that we now recognize as the
body of international human rights law exists as an entirely secular
construct, it represents to a greater or lesser degree the embodiment
of various religious or cultural traditions. Many principles of




III. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SPHERES OF GENDER INEQUALITY
In order to avoid the pitfalls of the binary of us and the other, we
may think about dealing with the issue of sex discrimination or
gender equality on two levels. The first focuses on the seemingly
unproblematic outward manifestations of gender equality. For
example, the rights of women to be free from violence in both the
public and private sphere; to secure access to education, healthcare,
and employment on a nondiscriminatory basis; to participate in
elections and governance at both the local and national level in the
same manner as men; and to obtain custody of their children in the
same way as men. These are general propositions that do not lend
themselves to disagreement by governments which are committed to
the principle of gender equality.
The second level, however, is more complex, requiring a more
nuanced approach. This level involves private choices and group
imperatives more prone to disagreement as to their discriminatory
basis. For example, the issues of polygamy, beauty competitions, or
women choosing to cover their heads in public cannot clearly be said
to be problematic manifestations of gender inequality. These are
broader cultural questions implicating women's choices and options,
and their interplay with cultural expectations and values.
For the purposes of legal reform, the appropriate focus should be
the first level, that is, the outward manifestations of discrimination
against women. The second level, involving private choices within
particular cultural contexts is more vexing, and therefore less
adaptable to legal reform. It is at this level, however, that the
dialogue amongst women requires not only candor, but the basic
acknowledgment that for the majority of women in the world,
particularly in the developing countries, life is not a series of choices
but rather a predestined set of arrangements based on, for example,
geographical location, family status, ethnic community, and family
expectations. Women's rights proponents may insist on a series of
8 Shaheen Sardar Ali argues for example that women's human rights in Islam "are not
entirely irreconcilable with current formulations of international human rights instruments".
See SHAHEEN SARDAR ALI, GENDER AND HuMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
EQUAL BEFORE ALLAH, UNEQUAL BEFORE MAN? 3 (2000); see also Sally Engle Merry, Rights,
Religion, and Community: Approaches to Violence Against Women in the Context of
Globalization, 35 LAw & Soc'y REv. 39, 40 (2001) (positing that competing models of social
justice-such as the competition between "religious" based models and "secular" models-are
fundamental problems faced in the struggle for women's human rights).
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seemingly rational choices to advance women's rights, but these
choices cannot be viewed in isolation. Rather, these choices must be
contextualized in the life mosaic in which all choices are
interrelated.
Largely because I grew up in apartheid South Africa, I have
actively chosen to tailor my personal and professional commitments
to the causes of non-racism and anti-sexism. I have lived a very
privileged life for several reasons, but most specifically because I
have been able to see my country transform itself from a pariah
nation-of-the-world, to one that stands as a model of democracy and
human rights-at least formally. It has also been a privilege to see
how the South African Constitution and specifically its expansive
Bill of Rights have been interpreted in such an innovative way by
the South African Constitutional Court. This court has eschewed
mere formal equality for a jurisprudence embracing substantive
equality and incorporating the concept of dignity as linked to
equality.9 But the existence of these formal rights raises many
contradictions in a society that is one of the most unequal in the
world, and one that is particularly hostile to women. This
inequality and hostility are evidenced by the alarming statistics on
violence against women, and the appalling conditions in which the
majority of South African women, particularly black women, live. 10
I have become interested in the situation of Afghanistan lately
because some aspects of Afghanistan's history and traditions
parallel that of South Africa, invoking similar contradictions and
raising similar questions. Both South Africa and Afghanistan are
immersed in political transitions, confronting-albeit to vastly
differing degrees-legacies of war, economic disparities, gender
inequities, violence, and upheaval.
Afghanistan embodies the tensions between secularism and
religion most acutely." South Africa's negotiated journey towards a
See President of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Hugo, 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC), available at
1997 SACLR LEXIS 91, at *81-82 (affirming the authority of South Africa's President to
pardon groups of prisoners when to do so would be to the public's benefit, and denying that
the President discriminated on the basis of gender when he released all female prisoners with
children under the age of twelve because it would benefit the children and society); see also S.
v. Makwanyane, 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC), available at 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *175-79
(invalidating all South African legislation sanctioning capital punishment because such
legislation is counter to Constitutional notions of human life and dignity).
10 See Penelope E. Andrews, Violence Against Women in South Africa: The Role of Culture
and the Limitations of the Law, 8 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 425, 444-45 (1999)
(suggesting that, even in the absence of formal statistics on violence against women in South
Africa, rape and domestic violence particularly have reached epidemic proportions).
11 See Shannon A. Middleton, Women's Rights Unveiled: Taliban's Treatment of Women in
20031
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constitutional dispensation required a careful balancing of
individual rights and communitarian approaches.12 But of course it
is disingenuous to draw simplistic analogies between the countries.
South Africa and Afghanistan are vastly different in terms of their
histories, demographics, political cultures, and legal systems. One
very significant difference exists in that law and legalism were
always intrinsic to the maintenance of apartheid in South Africa.
Afghanistan, on the other hand, has for decades been typified as a
society plagued by lawlessness. There are also many other
differences which I shall not explore here.
Indeed, South Africa and Afghanistan were in many ways the
sites of global struggle. The United Nations declared apartheid a
"crime against humanity,"' 3 and global feminists continuously
referred to the Taliban's treatment of women as "gender
apartheid."' 4  It is the conflict between the modern and the
traditional that is worth exploring. The purpose of utilizing South
Africa and Afghanistan as counterpoints is to elicit the dominant
themes and tensions around women's rights-and to raise some
possible suggestions for engaging with them in order to universalize
women's human rights effectively.
Afghanistan, 11 IND. INVL & COMP. L. REV. 421 (2001) (providing a discussion of the tensions
between women's rights and Islam).
12 Set ALLISTER SPARKS, TOMORROW IS ANOTHER COUNTRY: THE INSIDE STORY OF SOUTH
AFRICA'S ROAD TO CHANGE 120-32 (1995) (detailing the beginning of the negotiations to end
apartheid in South Africa).
" See Ibrahim J. Gassama, Reaffirming Faith in the Dignity of Each Human Being: The
United Nations, NGOs, and Apartheid, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1464, 1488 n.96 (1996)
(quoting G.A. Res. 2671F, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2671
(1970), the United Nations resolution in opposition to apartheid).
'4 Afghan Apartheid, 11 THE WOMEN'S WATCH 2, (Sept. 1997), at
http://iwraw.igc.org/publications/womenswatch/vol%2011-2%2OSeptmeber%201997.htm.
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